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Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law:  







Canadian public law blurs process and substance, a result confirming the prevailing view that 
this dichotomy ought never to be conceived as a simplistic bright-line distinction. Recent 
developments have created more than just a blurring but, rather, a strong linking or even fusion 
of the two. This paper probes the implications of these developments in public law. Section two 
briefly presents the historic and jurisprudential distinctions between process and substance and 
assesses its current legal import. Here I argue that judicially created analytic frameworks could 
assist by bringing a process-substance problem to the surface and constraining its potentially 
pernicious effects. Section three grounds this initial discussion in Canadian public law by 
showing how the distinction generally appears in judicial review of procedures in administrative 
law. The decisional framework employed in procedural fairness is examined. Sections four and 
five turn to two significant new developments in Canadian public law. Section four considers 
how the duty to consult and accommodate in public law completely fuses process and substance. 
Aboriginal administrative law currently provides the most vibrant and dynamic jurisprudential 
example of the conceptual puzzles that the distinction raises and its decisional framework 
exemplifies many of the tensions discussed in the paper as a whole. Section five examines the 
new Canadian approach to the substantive review of discretionary decisions and how the current 
decisional framework may fall short in terms of rights protection. The paper concludes that the 
‘transubstantiation’ of process and substance is conceptually and legally desirable due to the 
cross-fertilization of rule of law and democratic norms in public law and that improved 
decisional frameworks could fruitfully assist in this cross-fertilization. 
 
II.  SIGNIFYING PROBLEMS: PROCESS VERSUS SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL 
JURISPRUDENCE AND IN PUBLIC LAW 
 
A. Two conventional approaches to the separation of process and substance and why  
they don’t work 
 
The distinction between process and substance was never as conceptually bright-line as 
traditional jurisprudence would have it.1 The difficulty of rendering a clear distinction has long 
                                                
* Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. I am grateful to John Bell, 
Mark Elliott, Philip Murray, and Jason Varuhas for their constructive and incisive feedback. I would also like to 
thank the chair and co-presenters at the 2014 Public Law Conference panel where this chapter was originally 
presented—Cora Hoexter, Anashri Pillay and Tom Hickman—and audience members for helpful insights. 
1 See the discussion concerning the division between substance and procedure (or ‘adjective’ law), arguably created 
by Jeremy Bentham and criticized by John Austin in A Kocourek, ‘Substance and Procedure’ (1941) 10 Fordham 
Law Review 157.  
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been noted, despite the fact that law schools continue to teach as if the dichotomy remains crystal 
clear. 2 Even the strongest defender of the distinction—Jeremy Bentham—conceded that neither 
could conceptually exist without the other. He may, however, have firmly agreed with Thomas 
Hobbes that any suggestion that the two might be fused or co-exist in legal doctrines and analytic 
frameworks would amount to utter nonsense not unlike that absurd religious claptrap called 
transubstantiation.3 
 
Traditional jurisprudence therefore relegates matters that affect the existence, extent, or 
enforceability of rights and duties of the parties to a legal action as substance, not procedure. 
Procedure would then encompass all matters relating to the fairness or efficiency of the litigation 
and the evidentiary process (such as facts, judgments, and evidentiary rules). Alternatively, a 
second traditional approach relegates issues concerning the manner and means needed to access 
courts, the availability of remedies, and matters relating to justiciability as procedure. But fuzzy 
boundaries rapidly arise. 
 
Regarding the first approach—historically understood as a practical allocation—we 
quickly come to an imprecise demarcation when the distinction is broadly considered from an 
institutional and systemic perspective. We value procedural law in and of itself because it 
conforms to the ideal of the rule of law (ie, a norm-governed process). The ideal of the rule of 
law animates our collective hope that we can value, uphold, and legitimize a certain procedure 
because it will more likely to lead to a just outcome.4 This potentially just outcome is partly 
legitimated because it is the product of a fair procedure.5 The connection between procedure and 
substance as a matter of procedural justice, in turn, validates the institution of the judiciary and 
its associated legal practices. Substance and process are therefore inextricably entangled as a 
matter of procedural justice and just institutions.6 
                                                
2 Kocourek (n 1) 160-62 canvassed older jurisprudence proposing various ‘solutions’ to the conceptual problem by: 
(1) suggesting that procedural rules are wholly equivalent to substance (John W Salmond); or (2) subsuming process 
entirely into substance (Charles Frederic Chamberlayne); or (3) offering the notion of a penumbra or ‘twilight zone’ 
between process and substance (Walter Wheeler Cook in his seminal 1933 Yale Law Journal article entitled 
‘“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws’). Kocourek (n 1) 164 re-characterized the problem by 
suggesting the use of ‘telic rights’ instead of substance, and ‘instrumental rights’ instead of procedure, with the 
result that: ‘“Telic” rights are those abstract rights whose realization is effected by the concrete application, directly 
or indirectly, of “instrumental” rights’.  
3 He writes: ‘And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd … and Non-sense. 
And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immaterial 
Substances … but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, 
consubstantiate, eternal-Now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.’ R Tuck (ed), Leviathan (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) I.V, 19 at 35. 
4 See O Malcai and R Levine-Schnur, ‘Which Came First, the Procedure or the Substance? Justificational Priority 
and the Substance-Procedure Distinction’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. See also André Nollkaemper 
discussing the contemporary view in international criminal law that procedure does not merely enforce substance, 
but represents its own values that are not merely instrumental: A Nollkaemper, ‘International Adjudication of Global 
Public Goods: the Intersection of Substance and Procedure’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 769, 
782. 
5 Lawrence Solum argues that a complex view of the relationship between procedure and substance appreciates the 
‘ineliminable and inherent entanglement’ between them. He suggests that the real work of procedure is to ‘provide 
particular action-guiding legal norms’ across all areas of law for individuals and public actors: ‘Procedural Justice’ 
(2004) 78 Southern California Law Review 181, 224-25, 320.  
6 See Rawls’s conception of just institutions on this point: J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1993) 72.  
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The second approach encompasses several discrete points of fusion between process and 
substance. Standing and other justiciability doctrines, for example, procedurally regulate the 
initial stages of engaging the judicial process for accessing rights and enforcing duties. But, they 
also contain a significant element of substance because they affect the ultimate result.7 Alexander 
Bickel noted that when a court declines to hear a case on its merits, and provides little 
explanation, it indirectly validates the government’s action as a matter of substance.8 Moreover, 
by obtaining standing, a person is recognized as having legal status and a potentially valid legal 
claim requiring judicial resolution. The litigant gains a substantive right of access to a further 
protected right or enforceable duty. Standing is therefore an end in itself as a form of legal status, 
but also entails the recognition that one’s claim is justiciable and one can therefore make use of 
the available procedures to vindicate the right or enforce the duty. Standing further validates the 
courts as the appropriate forum in which to hear the legal matter thereby confirming their 
jurisdiction. In the way that many process and substance issues seem nested within each other, 
jurisdiction itself is also a further matter of substance (ie, the lawful and legitimate exercise of 
judicial power) and also of procedure (ie, the process used to structure a court’s discretionary 
control over its own processes).9  
 
To take another example, remedies combine process and substance because the substance 
of remedial principles is closely connected to the procedures of the particular court in which they 
are applied and because of their close connections with procedural doctrines of standing and 
justiciability.10 Without standing and a justiciable claim, a complainant cannot use procedures to 
access a remedy. And, finally, procedure may also include—if broadly construed—matters of 
interpretation and rules originating in the democratic process, both of which are often labelled 
substance.11 
 
Contemporary legal scholars emphasize that the consequences of the process/substance 
distinction are complex. Some consequences are concrete and relate only to the specific parties 
in the case, while others are more general and concern the operation of the overall legal system 
in terms of fairness, efficiency or justice.12 A difficulty arises, then, when we try to define the 
scope of the outcome of the legal process. A narrow view of a legal matter will see the 
consequences—and the process-substance dichotomy—differently than a broader scope that may 
engage considerations of jurisdiction and just institutions. At its broadest, the distinction orients 
us towards and grounds a conception of judicial review and its appropriate contours as expressed 
                                                
7 Malcai and Levine-Schnur (n 4) 7. 
8 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1986) 69. 
9 See R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1982] AC 617 where the House of Lords rejected the possibility of determining standing without reference to the 
substance of the claim for judicial review.  
10 Nollkaemper (n 4) 775. Michael Risinger cites Bentham for the view that the availability of remedies for a 
violation of a right is part of substantive law. See M Risinger, ‘“Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited (with Some 
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions”)’ (1983) 30 UCLA Law Review 189, 
191. 
11 Malcai and Levine-Schnur (n 4) 9. 
12 Ibid, 12. 
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in the principle of the rule of law, the principle of legality, the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, and the institutional demands of deference.13  
 
We therefore must confront a legal characterization puzzle inevitably involving judicial 
interpretation and issue framing.14 A formalistic approach will wish to see issues ‘naturally’ 
belonging to a particular category differentiated by form and function.15 Over time, these 
distinctions, if regularly applied and followed, will become a recognizable jurisprudential pattern 
with set expectations. This process in law possesses some similarity with how ‘genres’ are used 
to classify literary texts and other artistic works. Established authorities will rely on prior 
characterizations of the distinction such as the two approaches outlined above, however different 
institutions and areas of law contain the possibility of upsetting past characterizations and 
generating different legal consequences. A legal issue or rule might be characterized as 
procedural for one purpose, substantive for another, or even both at the same time. Does this 
blurring raise the Hobbesian view that we are talking about a legal absurdity? The answer is 
again no, but for a different reason than the categorization problem just discussed. 
 
B.  A pragmatic and functional approach to the distinction 
 
Many legal scholars who acknowledge the intractable nature of the categorization problem also 
concede that the legal distinction provides tactical and functional import in the management of 
legal disputes. Blurred therefore does not mean muddled and muddy and it becomes incumbent 
on courts to develop methods that help them navigate this difficult terrain, while exhibiting 
transparency in the methods that they themselves devise. Judges must therefore strive to 
faithfully apply the artificial reason and common law methods of reckoning that make use of 
logic, proportionality, principles of equity, and justice. 
 
In their article on the process-substance dichotomy, public law scholars David Dyzenhaus 
and Evan Fox-Decent suggest that the process/substance distinction is fraught with difficulty 
partly because the term ‘substance’ is itself ambiguous.16 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent raise the 
tantalizing suggestion that the traditional dichotomy is completely illusory—it is substance all 
the way down—but ultimately reject this conclusion.17 They instead argue that the distinction is 
not likely to disappear any time soon, that it does functionally serve to demarcate jurisdictional 
issues between other branches and the judiciary, and that it involves a necessary complication 
that points toward a defensible conception of judicial review in a democratic legal order. 
According to them, substance designates a legal area where judges are less likely to intervene, 
thereby engaging the principle of deference within a conception of the separation of powers. 
Substance serves as a criterion to legitimate the activity of judicial review or its denial. ‘Process’, 
on the other hand, indicates areas that the judiciary considers itself to be constitutionally charged 
or deems itself capable of supervising.  
                                                
13 D Dyzenhaus and E Fox-Decent, ‘Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada’ (2001) 51 
University of Toronto Law Journal 193, 196.  
14 On categorization in law generally, see AG Amsterdam and J Bruner, Minding the Law (Cambridge and London, 
Harvard University Press, 2002) ch 2. 
15 See K Petroski, ‘Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction’ (2012) 44 Loyola University Chicago Law 
189, 240–43. The  
16 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent (n 13) 195. 
17 Ibid, 196. 
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Traditionally in public law, judges left substance to the legislature and the executive 
while nominating themselves the guardians of procedure.18 Since the late 1970s and early 1980s 
in Canadian administrative law, the dichotomy has tracked the changes from the traditional 
‘Diceyan’ model of the judiciary with monopoly over adjudication, law interpretation and 
supervision through a correctness standard in administrative law (for both procedure and 
substance) to a more respectful judiciary that ought to exhibit ‘deference as respect’19 towards 
the legislative and executive branches. 
 
We can see this interplay at work in Canadian administrative law. Reviewing courts 
examine administrative procedures for fairness, but elements of procedure also act as justifying 
norms for the review of substance. The key link here—which will be discussed more fully in the 
section three—is the provision of reasons. Reasons may be required as part of the content of 
procedural fairness. But substantive review (ie judicial review of the decision or policy) also 
relies on reasons. The outcome of the decision may be justified as reasonable if the result stems 
from fair procedures and intelligible reasons. Here the legal dichotomy relies on an underlying 
philosophical distinction between procedural and substantive norms, but reasons simultaneously 
embody both types of norms. In Canadian administrative law (similar to administrative law in 
other common law countries), the process-substance distinction therefore indicates two avenues 
to access judicial review as well as at least two justificatory grounds for judicial deference to 
another branch of government: 1) the recognition of fair procedure; and, 2) the recognition of 
sound decision-making or policy application.  
 
Moreover, the process-substance dichotomy also engages questions of jurisdiction in 
public law, resolution of which in some respects operates in a manner akin to a conflict of laws. 
20 In a conflict of laws matter where an inter-state legal dispute involves both domestic and 
foreign law, the law of the forum governs matters of procedure, and matters of substance are 
governed by a choice of law rule that could privilege either domestic or foreign law. In Canadian 
administration law, a presumption of reasonableness has emerged in reasonableness review. This 
strong presumption of deference applies to all administrative decision-makers operating within 
their home statute in terms of process, interpretation, and substance.21 At judicial review, 
procedure is generally governed by judge-made common law, while substance is largely 
informed by the statutory objectives and norms applied by administrative actors (subject to 
common law judicial constraints on the scope of decision-making). In substantive review, the 
administrative decision-maker’s authority is generally viewed robustly, but judges can use 
common law principles to shape the exercise of discretion,22 to confirm or reject interpretive 
                                                
18 Ibid,195. 
19 Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ in M Taggart (ed), The Province of 
Administrative Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) 279, 286 is the source for the idea of ‘deference as respect’. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has cited this article, from whence the phrase comes, in several landmark cases.  
20 See Nollkaemper (n 4) on this point where he discusses how questions of jurisdiction are treated either as 
questions of substance or procedure depending on the territory, on the context, and also on the particular area of law. 
21 Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) [2013] 2 SCR 559 (presumption applies to all 
administrative actors, not just adjudicative tribunals, and includes ministers and other statutory delegates). 
22 Mission Institution v Khela 2014 SCC 24 (‘Khela’) (procedures involving discretionary choices may be owed 
deference by a reviewing court). 
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choices,23 to conclude that a decision does not exhibit rationality or proportionality,24 and to 
reject unreasonable outcomes 25 . In sum, the (rebuttable) presumption of reasonableness 
automatically privileges the interpretations and conclusions regarding substance, but also often 
the procedures used, by administrative decision-makers thereby averting institutional conflict. 
 
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent argue that, despite its inherent ambiguity, the notion of 
‘substance’ can serve a variety of functions including: 1) facilitating access to the remedy when 
process serves to deny a particular outcome because substance indicates the possibility of a right 
to a particular outcome; 2) indicating which body can define the content of procedural fairness 
thereby legitimating the actions used by administrative body to render a decision; 3) pointing to 
the form and content of procedural fairness when the statute leaves that determination to the 
administrative body and its judgment about the weight of factors that it uses; 4) supplying the 
justification requirement in procedural fairness, usually met by the provision of reasons, which 
blurs into the substance or reasonableness of the decision; and, 5) indicating political morality—
understood in a conception of fairness—which informs legal conceptions of procedural 
fairness.26  
 
C.  Good principles and proper methods 
 
Instead of striving for a clear a priori distinction between process and substance, then, 
contemporary thinking suggests that judges, lawyers, and administrative decision-makers 
develop decisional frameworks and other higher-order legal rules that operate as a cognitive 
process to bring these kinds of process-substance problems to the surface of legal thought and 
judgment. 27 While a comprehensive discussion of cognitive or analytic frameworks is not 
possible in this chapter, several insights from this growing literature are highly relevant.  
 
A key text from cognitive science is Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman, a 
book that illustrates the inescapable effects that experience, assumption, values, emotions, and 
unconscious biases have on our ability to think clearly and come to ‘right reason’.28 According to 
Kahneman, our mind is a dual-process model that contains two interactive modes of thinking, 
both of which produce the ‘thinking I’. System 1 is like the operation of automatic pilot, 
operating quickly and continuously with little effort and producing intuitive, unconscious 
thought. It is impressionistic, metaphorical, associative, and cannot be switched off. It ‘authors’ 
our thought without us even being aware of its activity. System 2 is slower, deliberative and 
                                                
23 McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission) [2013] 3 SCR 895, 2013 SCC 67 (administrative decision-
makers have the ‘interpretive upper hand’ in their home statute). 
24 Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 12 (‘Loyola’) (reasonableness review requires 
proportionality and the minister must exercise discretion to advance the freedom of religion enjoyed by a Catholic 
high school). 
25 Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134, 2011 SCC 44 (‘Insite’) (the 
minister’s decision not to grant an exemption for a provincial safe injection facility was arbitrary in substance and 
disproportionate in its effects). 
26 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent (n 13) 195-96. This links back to the understanding of fairness in Rawls’s theory of 
justice.  
27 This kind of jurisprudential resolution is one that even Hobbes might approve: ‘The first cause of Absurd 
conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method … .’ See Tuck (n 3) 35. 
28 D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 2013). 
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more effortful, requiring our attention when it is operative. It is associated with agency, choice, 
concentration, and complex computations and so is considered more rational.29 System 1 controls 
most of our actions and generates a ‘narrative’ that allows us to make sense of the world we 
encounter. It enables us to perform the thousands of daily complex tasks we need to do, but 
unconsciously and often automatically. It is, however, prone to common reasoning errors 
because of its associative nature and its mode of ‘jumping to conclusions’. System 2 kicks into 
gear when System 1 is challenged and it can oversee and correct System 1, but only if pushed to 
do so, because it is lazy.  
 
This relatively recent research on human cognition contains valuable insights for law. 
Foremost is the fact that when decision-makers (either individual persons or professional 
decision-makers) approach the decision-making process, they unavoidably bring background 
influences and values with them, not all about which they are aware.30 Judges form ideas and 
beliefs about issues and people by drawing on their previous experiences, both personal and 
professional. Such expert intuition, Kahneman suggests, can be reliable if a field requires skills 
to discern and an environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable.31 Law and legal 
reasoning can satisfy these requirements, and this fit is often expressed in the concept of 
‘common sense’ deliberation.32 Nevertheless, these regularities do not necessarily arise to a 
robust statistical level of the kind typical of poker playing, medicine, stocks, and athletics. 
 
Instead of pretending that a completely objective judgment is achievable, judges should 
mitigate arbitrariness by using thinking techniques that encourage them to be ‘mindful’.33 These 
techniques can stimulate and support System 2 modes of thinking. Common techniques include 
being open to new information in order to check conclusions and avoid overconfidence, taking 
into account more than one perspective in order to counter tunnel vision,34 and creating new 
categories to (re)sort information. These techniques may help us to understand how we make 
errors in choices and judgment. They make us aware of the role of our emotions in deliberation 
                                                
29 See Kahneman (n 28) chapters 1–3 for further elaboration. 
30 For elaboration on these points, see Kahneman (n 28) chapters 4–5.  
31 See Kahneman (n 28) chapter 6.  
32 Insights from cognitive science animate the legal literature on jury deliberation, procedural problems resulting in 
miscarriages of justice, judicial biases based involving stereotypes, and promoting empathy in judicial decision-
making. See SA Bandes, ‘Remorse and Demeanor in the Courtroom: Cognitive Science and the Evaluation of 
Contrition’ (2013) DePaul Legal Studies Research Paper No 14-05 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363326) 
N Negowetti, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception’ (2012) Valparaiso University Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 12-15 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164325); DL Martin, ‘Lessons about 
Justice From the Laboratory of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt, and Informer 
Evidence’ (2001–02) 70 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 847; Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
33 The literature on ‘mindfulness’ zeroes in on the contextualized nature of thinking or judging, rather than empirical 
models of the brain. See J Nedelsky, ‘Receptivity and Judgment’ (2011) 4 Ethics & Global Politics  231; J 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011).  
34 Nedelsky’s work on reflective judgment focuses on overcoming cognitive biases like tunnel vision. Nedelsky 
claims that mindfulness is an imaginative act of contextualized thinking that leads the rational agent to challenge her 
own subjectivity by broadening her frame of reference. Contrast this with Martha Nussbaum’s work on empathy and 
judgment where she describes empathy as ‘an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience’ that does 
not require us to align our interests with that of another person. Nussbaum (n 32) 302. 
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and direct us to analyze how our internal narrative framing affects beliefs, choices, and 
assessment of facts or evidence.35  
 
These analytic frameworks cannot resolve the problem of characterization but, instead, 
guide thinking so that choices can become more consciously made, more transparent, and ideally 
accompanied by reasons explaining why a particular categorical choice or generic distinction has 
been made. This is important when we realize that characterization is not just performed for a 
practical purpose, but has sometimes profound normative consequences. With a framework in 
place, a court can either develop further or re-visit prior characterizations made by legislatures, 
parties, lawyers, lower courts, and administrative decision-makers. Attention therefore shifts 
from a focus on one-and-for-all fixing the difference between substance and process to a 
necessary examination of how well these frameworks and their accompanying interpretive 
methodologies are working.  
 
This section has argued that the process/substance distinction, while tenable, is fraught 
with tensions and must be viewed as shifting and complex. Substance informs process and 
process legitimizes substance ultimately providing the justificatory grounds for judicial review as 
a set of institutional practices and normative choices. The answer lies in becoming aware of how 
and why a legal matter is characterized as one or the other and what results from that. Not all 
doctrinal areas make use of decisional frameworks that aim to bring substantive-procedural 
characterization matters into sharper focus. Canadian administrative law, however, does. 
 
The chapter now turns to three recent examples of this blurring of substance and 
procedure and the three frameworks that have been created to assist: procedural fairness, the duty 
to consult and accommodate, and substantive review of discretionary decisions. 
 
III.  CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE: PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS AS THE FIRST FAULT LINE 
 
Section II briefly examined how the process-substance connection already exists in public law 
generally and administrative law in particular. It probed how the distinction is used to, among 
other functions, establish jurisdiction thereby legitimizing judicial review. When the process-
substance distinction is raised, one can readily discern the presence of fault lines or stressors in 
the jurisprudential terrain. These stressors create high anxiety in appellate judges who see the 
implications of the distinction and know that a particular stressor can quickly and easily crack 
open the ‘Pandora’s Box of legality’.36 This section first presents the current framework used to 
determine the content of procedural fairness in Canadian administrative law. It then turns to the 
three main stressors in procedural fairness—legitimate expectations, weight, and reasons—
stressors that resonate in developments that the next two sections consider. 
 
  
                                                
35 See Kahneman (n 28) chapter 34. 
36 Evan Fox-Decent uses this term to describe the judicial anxiety arising from the realization that procedural 
fairness has substantive implications. See E Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 189–190. 
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A.  The Baker framework for determining the content of procedural fairness 
 
In Canadian administrative law, a reviewing court asks one overarching question to determine 
the content of the duty of fairness for review of the procedures used by an administrative 
decision-maker: Was the procedure used in this case fair considering all of the circumstances? 
To answer this question, a court employs what is now termed the ‘Baker framework’—an 
analytic, decisional framework of the kind identified in section two.37 When considering and 
applying the framework, the reviewing court must find a balance among an open list of factors 
and principles that include: 
 
The Baker Framework 
1. the nature of the decision and the process followed  
2. the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of review  
3. the importance of the decision to the individual(s) affected  
4. the legitimate expectations of the persons challenging the decision  
5. the need to respect agency expertise in determining and following its own procedures 
 
Despite strong judicial statements that no one factor takes priority over the other, four of these 
factors ‘pull’ a reviewing court closer to or further away from deference, minimal intrusion, and 
a sole focus on process: 1, 3, 4, and 5. I have used the phrase ‘pull’ to indicate that some factors 
may carry more ‘weight’ in the context of a particular case, though they may appear neutral 
initially. A reviewing court accords weight to a particular factor that, in turn, may pull the judges 
towards greater scrutiny and intrusion. Factors 3 and 4 indicate elements that most clearly blur 
the process/substance distinction and move what is generally conceived solely as review of 
procedures towards review on substantive fairness grounds.38 
 
B.  How the framework blurs process and substance 
 
Regarding Factor 1—the nature of the decision and the process followed—less deference or 
more scrutiny will be demanded if, for example, the nature of the decision is closer to the judicial 
process or if a right of appeal exists. Most courts take the traditional view that tribunals are not 
owed ample deference on procedural fairness matters and that the standard of fairness is a 
rigorous one akin to correctness. More deference, however, may be appropriate when the 
enabling statute delegates broad discretion to make procedural choices to the decision-maker. 
The result is a lessening intensity in the standard of review for procedures—from a stricter 
standard akin to correctness towards a reasonableness standard that reflects respect for agency 
expertise (or Factor 5). In other words, Factors 1, 2, and 5 can combine to produce a posture that 
mirrors the reasonableness standard used in substantive review.39 The Supreme Court of Canada 
in the Khela decision best expressed this contextually deferential stance using the words “margin 
of deference” to the administrative decision-maker (in this case a Commissioner or Warden of a 
                                                
37 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817, [21]–[28]. 
38 For commentary on the concept of substantive fairness in Australian and New Zealand administrative law, see K 
Stern, ‘Substantive Fairness in UK and Australian Law’ (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 266 and DR Knight, 
‘Simple, Fair, and Discretionary Administrative Law’ (2012) 2 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 34. 
39 For academic commentary on the possibility of fusing procedural and substantive review in this way, see P Daly, 
‘Canada’s Bi-Polar Administrative Law: Time for Fusion’ (2014) 40 Queen’s Law Journal 213.  
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prison) who employed a procedure that required the exercise of discretion (in this case, 
withholding information from the prisoner).40 More deference will be accorded if the nature of 
the decision is polycentric in substance (ie involving many parties) or if it involves complex 
considerations regarding the public good. More deference will therefore be shown to an 
administrative body that is acting ‘legislatively’ or in complex policy matters rather than 
‘judicially’—terms that are both synonyms for substance and process respectively. 41 Cases that 
fall at the legislative end may be viewed as near non-justiciable or highly inappropriate for 
judicial review. 
 
More content will also be required if the decision involves a strong individual right and 
the decision is very important to the individual (eg matters concerning livelihood, personal 
security, reputation and so on).42 The Baker framework is a balancing exercise implicitly guided 
by the principle of proportionality. Factor 3 implicitly compels judges to engage in mini-
balancing or proportionality exercise since the substance of the individual right must be weighed 
relative to the other factors that may compete. In practice, the content of procedural fairness 
varies mostly depending on the strength of Factor 3—the right, interest or privilege being 
weighted as more or less important against the other variables. This mini-proportionality review 
within procedural fairness calls into play concerns about the limits of judicial review, 
parliamentary supremacy, and legislative intent. Canadian administrative law wavers between 
adhering to legislative intent, primarily through statutory communications about process 
requirements, and engaging in judicial creativity by augmenting content on common law 
grounds. As Paul Craig argues, the “reality was that a general presumption of legislative intent 
had to be framed in abstract terms, to the effect that Parliament believed in justness between 
citizen and government and that this generated a general legislative intent that statutes should 
comply with the precepts of public law developed by the common law courts over time, subject 
to any special legislative intervention … ”.43 The Baker framework has brought into focus, but 
not really at the surface, demands for ‘process legitimacy’ that blur the process-substance 
distinction in judicial decisions.44 
 
In some cases, the weight given to a particular factor will be the same as the initial 
decision-maker, but in others the court may re-determine weight explicitly or implicitly and the 
re-weighting may have substantive remedial effects. When Factor 1 is more substantive—that is 
more legislative or discretionary or broadly policy-oriented—then Factor 3’s weight may be 
quite curtailed or even eliminated. But when Factor 3 is strong, and the remedy is the decision 
gets sent back for reconsideration, the practical effect may be that the decision-maker has before 
                                                
40 Khela (n 22) [89]. The concept of ‘substantive fairness’ as a fusion of process and substance appears to be on the 
horizon in Canadian procedural fairness, but it is as unclear whether or not it has any legs. 
41 For a discussion of so-called legislative decisions, see G Huscroft, ‘From Natural Justice to Fairness – Thresholds, 
Content, and the Role of Judicial Review’ in C Flood and L Sossin (eds), Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed 
(Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2013). Cabinet and ministerial decisions, for example, may be exempt from the 
common law duty of fairness if they are characterized as broad policy decisions or appear legislative in form (eg an 
order-in-council). 
42 Note, however, that procedural fairness protects not just rights, but also privileges and interests. See Cardinal v 
Director of Kent Institution [1985] 2 SCR 643, 653. 
43 PP Craig, ‘The Nature of Reasonableness Review’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 131, 160. 
44 Fox-Decent (n 36) 189 discusses how the majority in the Knight case amplified the content of procedural fairness 
using, in part, the principle of legitimacy. 
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them only one possible outcome, and process blurs into substance again. This was the result in 
the Baker case. The administrative official had to reconsider the original decision to deny Mavis 
Baker an exemption to apply for permanent resident status on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds by taking into greater account the best interests of her Canadian-born children. Only two 
possibilities therefore remained for that office: to approve or deny the exemption. The exemption 
was approved. As a result of this case, greater substance—weightier principles and additional 
values—were simultaneously imported into the process of judicial review as well as the 
decision-making procedure used by immigration officials. In many cases, a procedural remedy 
like reconsideration (certiorari combined with mandamus) will have a substantive result because 
the decision-maker will be so constrained by the court’s reasoning and final determination that 
only one option will be before her: using an improved process to render the same decision as the 
court.  
 
Factor 4 distinguishes Canada from some other common law jurisdictions, like the United 
Kingdom and South Africa.45 Canadian jurisprudence explicitly and repeatedly states that 
legitimate expectations confers only procedural protection and is available only if government 
conduct includes an overt promise, representation, undertaking or regular practice.46 If Canada 
had substantive legitimate expectations, instead of only procedural, then Factor 4 would have the 
potential to exert greater pull. To date, Canadian courts have shown no willingness to revisit the 
jurisprudential ousting of substantive legitimate expectations in administrative law.47 This denial 
of substantive legitimate expectations makes the Baker framework appear more ‘procedural’ 
than ‘substantive,’ but this is a false conclusion for several reasons. 
 
C.  The three ‘stressors’: weight, legitimate expectations, and reasons 
 
Firstly, as discussed above, the mini-proportionality exercise required by Factor 3 blurs process 
and substance by requiring reviewing courts to weigh the five factors and balance them against 
each other. Secondly, and briefly adverted to above, the denial of substantive legitimate 
expectations makes the Baker framework appear more procedural than substantive, but this is a 
false conclusion overall and one that is subject to no jurisprudential change around legitimate 
expectations. It may only be a matter of time, and with the right case, that Canadian public law 
reverses the bright line it has drawn between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations 
and follows the lead established by courts in South Africa and the United Kingdom.48 Thirdly, 
                                                
45 See C Hoexter, ‘The Enforcement of Official Promises in South African Law: Process, Substance and the 
Constitutional Court’ (paper given at the 2014 Public Law Conference, Faculty of Law, University of 
Cambridge); G Weeks and M Groves, ‘The Legitimacy of Expectations about Fairness: Can process and substance 
be untangled?’ (paper prepared for the 2014 Public Law Conference, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge); CF 
Forsyth, ‘Legitimate Expectations Revisited’ (ALBA Summer Conference, 29 May 2011) (available at 
www.adminlaw.org.uk/library/publications.php); A Perry and F Ahmed, ‘The Coherence of the Doctrine of 
Legitimate Expectations’ [2014] Cambridge Law Journal 61.  
46 See Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi [2011] 2 SCR 504, [68]. 
47 Even in English law, many legitimate expectations cases concern only procedure. Substantive legitimate 
expectations provide protection from actions a court may conclude are an abuse of public power to disappoint. See 
Laws LJ in Niazi v Secretary of State [2008] EWCA 755, [41]–[42]. 
48 The Supreme Court has recently made more use of the mandamus remedy to order Ministers to exercise their 
discretion in specific ways in both the Insite (n  25) and Loyola (n 24) cases. It may be that this kind of move toward 
more intrusive remedies may have an effect on legitimate expectations as courts move away from the doctrine of 
improper fettering of discretion and overcome their reticence about substantive expectations.  
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and as discussed in section two, the duty to give reasons further erodes the distinction between 
process and substance in judicial review.  
 
Canadian scholars have long noted that the connection between dignity interests, 
legitimacy, and the common law reasons requirement. In an early analysis of Baker, David 
Mullan stated that the Supreme Court came ‘close to trading in “fairness” as a substantive and 
not purely procedural concept. … Indeed, it serves to further emphasize that there is no bright 
line between procedural and substantive review.’ 49 Very quickly, the reasons requirement 
became a problem for judicial review. Litigation around the quality or adequacy of reasons 
further stressed the distinction since it was not clear if poorly executed reasons constituted only a 
procedural flaw or were properly a matter for substantive review as the reasoning undermined 
the reasonableness of the decision.  
 
The Supreme Court recognized the possibility that a severe fault line around the reasons 
requirement could completely collapse the distinction between process and substance and moved 
quickly to shore it up in the Newfoundland Nurses case.50 In this case, the Court confirmed that 
inadequate reasons are indeed not reviewed under procedural fairness but, rather, through 
reasonableness review. The only question regarding reasons in review for procedural fairness is: 
are reasons required by the common law or not? All other questions regarding the adequacy—in 
form or content—should be dealt in substantive review. By relegating the adequacy of reasons to 
substantive review, the court was also able to re-affirm its own jurisdiction. Procedural fairness 
review could continue to treat the absence of reasons with more judicial scrutiny since 
procedural fairness is akin to correctness review in Canadian administrative law. The Court 
therefore affirmed its traditional guardianship and checking of administrative procedures. The 
Court then bolstered its more deferential stance in substantive review by affirming that the 
adequacy of reasons is a matter for reasonableness—not correctness—review. By making this 
move, the Court forestalled another potential stressor—the collapsing of the distinction between 
reasonableness review and review of the merits of the decision—by removing the possibility of 
using the most intrusive standard, correctness, to get at the merits through the reasons that were 
offered or could be offered to support a decision.51 
 
Legitimate expectations, weight, and reasons are three stressors for the process/substance 
distinction in procedural fairness. While the Supreme Court has worked hard to protect common 
law procedural review from these stressors, their disruptive potential has come to the fore in a 
related, but novel, area of law—the duty to consult and accommodate in Aboriginal 
administrative law. 
 
                                                
49 D Mullan, ‘Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) – A Defining Moment in Canadian 
Administrative Law’ (1999) 7 Reid’s Administrative Law 145, 151. 
50 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62, 
[2011] 3 SCR 708 (‘Newfoundland Nurses’). 
51 In English law, the absence of reasons may be challenged as procedurally unfair or as substantively unreasonable. 
See T Endicott, Administrative Law, 2nd ed (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) 186–215. This chapter 
cannot address the recent Canadian case law where courts have ‘coopered up’ reasons ‘which could be offered’ by 
statutory delegates when the reasons are deficient or sometimes non-existent. 
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IV.  EXPECTING LEGITIMACY: THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE AS 
THE SECOND FAULT LINE 
 
This section analyzes the process/substance distinction in what is now called Aboriginal 
administrative law in Canada. Aboriginal law is a distinct area of public law and involves 
constitutional, common law, statutory law, international law, and increasingly Indigenous 
customary law. In keeping with the overall historical development of Aboriginal law in Canada, 
the duty to consult and accommodate differs significantly from other forms of consultation and 
accommodation in public law such as those found in labour and human rights law. Instead, it is a 
sui generis blend of administrative and constitutional law. This is because the source of the 
various duties differs, originating in the early sovereign-to-sovereign relations between the 
British Crown and Indigenous peoples. The roots of Aboriginal public law therefore predate the 
establishment in 1867 of the positive legal authority that Confederation represents in Canada.  
 
A.  The honour of the Crown as the guiding principle for process and substance 
 
The Royal Proclamation of 176352 constitutes one fundamental source of the Crown’s legal 
relations with Indigenous peoples in North America. Key promises from the Royal Proclamation 
include the Crown’s overall obligation to protect Indigenous rights from settler encroachment, 
the guarantee that Indigenous peoples should be able to access to a legal system in order to 
benefit from good governance, and the promise to resolve disputes equitably through a judiciary 
committed to the rule of law. The Royal Proclamation has been interpreted as one key source for 
the fiduciary nature of the constitutional relationship between the Crown and Indigenous 
peoples.53 It is also a source for the resulting principle of the honour of the Crown, which the 
Supreme Court of Canada describes in this way in the landmark Haida Nation case:  
 
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were 
never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown 
through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The 
potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and 
respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes 
of negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to 
consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.54 
 
                                                
52 Royal Proclamation 1763 (UK), reprinted RSC 1985, App II, No 1. 
53 Two key cases explain the source and nature of the fiduciary relationship: Guerin v R [1984] 2 SCR 335 and R v 
Sparrow [1996] 3 SCR 101. The fiduciary relationship is rooted in the concept of Aboriginal title, which pre-exists 
the assertion of Crown sovereignty in Canada, and entails the requirement, outlined above, that Aboriginal interests 
in land may be alienated only by surrendering the land to the Crown so as to prevent exploitation from third parties 
such as settlers.  
54 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 25 (‘Haida Nation’). 
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These promises, and the subsequent understanding of the Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary 
relationship, informs section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, the provision which 
constitutionally guarantees Aboriginal rights.55 
 
The duty to consult and accommodate acts as a sub-principle of the principle of the 
honour of the Crown. It can arise in four contexts: historical treaties, comprehensive modern land 
claims agreements, proved Aboriginal rights and title, and unproved Aboriginal rights and title. 
The duty rests on both federal and provincial governments and their agents, representatives, 
and/or delegated authorities. 56  The duty will therefore also engage decisions made by 
administrative actors and tribunals. 57  The duty primarily regulates the relations among 
Indigenous peoples, the executive branch, and the courts. 
 
My main interest is with the most vulnerable area: unproved rights and interests. Though 
not fully grounded in the fiduciary nature of the principle of the honour of the Crown—because 
the interests and rights have not yet been recognized (unlike s. 35 rights)—the duty nevertheless 
entails that government action which negatively affects an unproved Indigenous right and 
deprives the community of their benefits—real or potential—will be found inconsistent with this 
principle and will require protection from the courts. Otherwise, the integrity of the 
constitutional order would be at risk because the judiciary would be permitting the Crown to run 
roughshod over potentially weighty, but unproved minority rights, and the judiciary’s legitimacy, 
in turn, would be imperiled. Recognized Indigenous rights possess independent force or 
presumptive weight that ought to be given priority in government decision-making implicating 
broad policy or economic considerations, and the need to and balance with other competing 
rights and interest.58 Unrecognized rights and interests do not carry this same weight, but may 
become recognized and hence are vulnerable in the transition stages to full recognition. 
Importantly then, Haida Nation provides a framework for preventing the abuse of claimed 
Indigenous rights in the early stages before they achieve full status in Canadian law.  
 
These types of Indigenous rights cases involve often profound uncertainty about the 
nature of the right. Moreover, the implementation process for fulfilling the duty is complex due 
to multiple stakeholders in the affected community and many non-legal variables including 
economic, political, cultural and social factors. The judicial approach to Crown-Aboriginal 
relations that the Haida Nation framework represents also relieves the judiciary from a variety of 
remedial dilemmas including imposing interlocutory injunctions on government or private action 
and also forestall ongoing supervision by the courts. In many respects, the substantive remedial 
tail waived the procedural rights dog in the original case and this problem—how far should 
courts go to protect Indigenous rights?— plagues the case law. This result confirms the two 
problems that Lawrence Solum suggests procedural justice must face: (1) to provide accurate 
                                                
55 Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982 reads: ‘The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.’ The provision has been interpreted to mean that existing 
Aboriginal rights ought not to be diminished due to the effects of colonization. 
56 The Crown can delegate some procedural aspects to private actors such as industry partners, and they must 
properly perform that delegated power: Haida Nation (n 54) 53. 
57 Tribunals empowered to consider questions of law and whose decisions affect potential Aboriginal interests and 
rights must also satisfy the duty. See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council 2010 SCC 43. 
58 Where an existing constitutionally-protected Aboriginal right is affected, the Crown must grant it priority both in 
the process used to allocate resources and in the actual resulting allocation. See R v Gladstone [1996] 2 SCR 723. 
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outcomes at a reasonable cost; and (2) to address the deeper problem of working out shared goals 
when a consensus about these goals may not exist.59  
 
B.  The framework for the duty to consult and accommodate 
 
Similar to common law procedural fairness, the duty to consult and accommodate in Aboriginal 
administrative law works with a higher-order, decisional framework—but it is much more 
complicated than the Baker framework and even further instantiates process and substance. The 
legal framework that crystallized in the Haida Nation case has two functions. First, it aims to 
guide negotiations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments when established 
Indigenous rights and interests are affected by non-Indigenous decision-makers at both the 
federal and provincial levels of government. Second, it aims to prevent the abuse of Indigenous 
rights and interests in the stages before they obtain full legal recognition. 
 
The framework for the duty to consult and accommodate contains two parts: (1) 
consultation, which is largely, though not wholly, procedural in nature; and (2) accommodation, 
which is mainly substantive, but is also procedural. The procedural components of the duty to 
consult mirror those commonly found in the duty of fairness in administrative law but, because 
of the constitutional nature of the Indigenous right or interest, the content of the norm does differ 
and, unlike common law procedural fairness, involves specific reciprocal duties on both the 
Crown and Indigenous peoples. 
 
The Haida Nation framework is premised on an ideal model of stages and steps that a 
government should follow if it wishes to fulfill the duty satisfactorily. Four stages are 
contemplated, each with its own set of steps that to be implemented: 1) Stage 1 examines the 
Crown’s real or constructive knowledge; 2) Stage 2 involves a spectrum approach to determining 
the scope of the duty that rests on the Crown; 3) Stage 3 determines if consultation obligations 
have been met or are required; 4) Stage 4 considers whether or not accommodation is required 
and, if it is, what is its content. Each stage is accompanied by the standard of review a court will 
use to examine the decision when it is challenged at that particular time in the framework. The 
table below sets out the framework: 
 
  
                                                
59 Solum (n 5) 320. 
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Framework for the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Steps Crown engages in 
high-level strategic 
decision-making in 
various policy areas. 
Crown has 
knowledge (real or 
constructive) of a 
potential Aboriginal 
right or title. 
Crown determines 
scope of duty by 
engaging in a 
“spectrum” analysis. 
Crown consults with 
affected parties 
(consultation need 
only be adequate). 
Accommodation 
(may be required). 
Substeps  Step 1 of Stage 1 
“The trigger” of 
Crown knowledge. 
Step 2 of Stage 1 
Crown decides to act. 
Step 3 of Stage 1 
Crown knows of 
potential adverse 
effect from its 
decision to act. 
Crown engages in the 
first mini-
proportionality 
analysis by balancing 
the strength of the 
Aboriginal claim with 
other variables such 
as the potential 
impact on the 
right/interest and/or 
public interest. 






opposite, if not. 




competing interests in 
a second mini-
proportionality 




usually through the 
provision of reasons. 
Stage 4 may require 
modification of 
decision or policy to 




No review of Crown 
discretion at this 
stage. 
Reasonableness Correctness for 
strength of claim and 
severity of impact. 
Unless decision 
involves a large 














and balancing of 
interests. 
 
Ideally, the duty to consult and accommodate permits courts to oversee the executive branch to 
check the wide-ranging power of the Crown chiefly by eliminating broad or unstructured 
discretion.60 A reviewing court will accord a margin of appreciation to the process used and the 
policy choices made by the Crown in either of the two proportionality analyses indicated in the 
table above. A reviewing court will ask whether or not consultation was reasonably adequate 
given the circumstances. In order to answer this question, the reviewing court will need to look at 
whether the process used was meaningful in proportion to the seriousness of the harm. It should 
also examine whether the Crown’s practice of informing itself and consulting affected parties 
was in good faith. Lastly, the reviewing court considers whether or not a reasonable balance was 
struck between Indigenous and other interests/values in its final decision, including whether or 
not the outcome is reasonably accommodating of the prioritized Indigenous interests. The 
standard of review ‘toggles’ according to the particular stage with case law confirming that 
correctness is the norm for the question of law concerning the strength of the claim but with 
reasonableness as the preferred standard for other components of the duty. Notably, as the table 
above indicates, reasonableness and fairness are often fused when scrutiny turns to the adequacy 
                                                
60 The Crown’s fiduciary obligation facilitates judicial ‘supervision of the high degree of discretionary control 
gradually assumed by the Crown over the lives of aboriginal peoples’: Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada [2002] 4 
SCR 245, [79]. 
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of the consultation process indicating a tangled movement towards substantive procedural 
fairness in this jurisprudence. 
 
In this area of public law, the duty to consult and accommodate completely fuses process 
and substance. Process, however, routinely works to undermine substance because of judges’ 
desire to avoid the underlying issues of emergent Indigenous sovereignty, development of self-
government as a more complex form of Canadian federalism, and demands for a post-colonial 
relationship. Though never fully addressed in consultation cases—indeed, the conundrum of 
sovereignty is often submerged even in Aboriginal title cases—the duty must manage conflicts 
arising from the existence of multiple communities whose claims contradict the unilateral 
assertion of Crown sovereignty originally made by the British sovereign. In this area, then, the 
two major ‘stressors’ are relations between sovereigns and polycentricity. 
 
The duty, however, is plagued by key structural weaknesses including: the burden of 
knowledge on under-resourced Indigenous groups to specify alleged infringements as well as 
potential harms; the problem of inadequate notice to affected Indigenous communities; the 
presence of too much Crown discretion; judicial deference; and inadequate accommodation. The 
weakness that I want to focus on is accommodation since accommodation is the final stage of a 
process (consultation), but is also a substantive end in itself and therefore fuses the distinction. 
 
C.  How the two stressors create a sub-optimal fusion of process and substance 
 
At judicial review, Haida Nation advises judges to focus ‘not on the outcome, but on the process 
of consultation and accommodation’.61 These instructions—at odds with how the standard of 
review works in administrative law in general—seem to indicate strongly that those procedural 
violations, rather than unreasonable outcomes, will first trigger a remedy. Conventional 
administrative law remedies such as remitting an unsatisfactory consultative case back to the 
original decision-making to engage in further consultation (process), or to reconsider some of the 
factors that lead to the original unreasonable decision (substance), often leave a vacuum given 
the breadth of Crown discretion, potential for unilateral arbitrary, behaviour, or lack of capacity. 
Conventional remedies regularly result in the under-enforcement of Indigenous rights through 
the duty to consult and accommodate. The two major stressors—relations between sovereigns 
and polycentricity—account for both legal complexity and sub-optimal enforcement. 
 
We can see that the envisaged process demands that government decision-makers make 
efforts to understand the interests that are asserted by Indigenous claimants and to assess the 
potential harms that Indigenous communities perceive government action might cause. This 
awareness, however, does not always translate into substantial accommodation whereby action is 
barred or policy is markedly modified.62 What kinds of actions will be inconsistent with the 
Crown’s duty? Again, it is up to the decision-maker to determine as a matter of discretionary 
judgment the intensity of the effects of infringement, resulting in both a skewed process and a 
potentially arbitrary outcome. The process selected by the government decision-maker could fail 
                                                
61 Haida Nation (n 54) [63] (emphasis added).  
62 For an illustration of judicial conflict about substantive accommodation, see West Moberly First Nations v British 
Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines) 2011 BCCA 247 (‘West Moberly’) [163]–[165]. In this decision, the reviewing 
court folded substantive accommodation back into a future consultative process. 
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and thereby never attend to the need for accommodation because it did not allow for the kind of 
knowledge that is essential for the assessment of the impact and harm. The decisional framework 
of the duty seemingly aims to correct for this possibility, but anxieties about substance often 
mean that this potential is not realized. 
 
André Nollkaemper argues that the procedures employed to guide and shape substantive 
law themselves reflect normative choices and our assessment of these choices depends on 
“whom we want to entrust with making them.”63 Aboriginal administrative law illustrates a 
collective action problem when public values, which require recognition and enforcement, are 
weakened. These values are ‘public goods’ requiring protection in the name of individual cases 
and the larger public interest. If government decision-makers do not consult properly, they will 
inevitably fail to accommodate properly, and the process/substance connection will function sub-
optimally. Nollkaemper further writes that: “Procedures, and the voices that can be heard 
through procedure, are part of the process for identifying what a public good is, how to interpret 
it and how to strike balances when it comes to conflict with other public goods.”64 We need to 
know if those claimants who are making use of legal procedures and framing legal arguments see 
their own understanding of values and public goods reflected back in administrative and judicial 
decisions. The substantive political issues of recognition and representation and the 
corresponding existential problems of Indigenous loyalty, voice and exit anxiously percolate 
throughout these cases. 
 
The process/substance problem is further exacerbated when multiple parties and decision-
makers are involved—as is often the case in this polycentric area where a case may involve 
several Aboriginal groups, more than one government decision-maker, industry third parties, 
and/or interest groups. Nollkaemper, citing examples from international law, calls the kinds of 
complex public goods prevalent in these cases ‘aggregate-effort’ goods and includes cases 
involving climate change and nuclear weapons as examples.65 The uncertainty posed by the 
unproved rights and interests, combined with the polycentric nature of the cases, invites a high 
degree of deference from reviewing courts. Indeed, these cases appear at the ‘legislative end’ of 
the spectrum of decisions that a reviewing court may or may not review. Though this paper does 
not consider claims that common law procedural fairness should be extended to address citizens’ 
demands for greater democratic participation in government or regulatory decision-making, it 
does, however suggest that Indigenous participatory rights should be increased to overcome the 
prohibition against interfering in policy-oriented or ‘legislative’ decisions.66 
 
Courts are increasingly grappling with these aggregate and competing public goods and 
disagreement exists over the question of which substantive values procedural rules should serve. 
Courts may also not be fully attentive to, or not wish to address, the balance of power. 
Procedural fairness and lack of substantive equality between the parties may pull the judge in 
different directions. As Thomas Main argues, procedures are ‘an instrument of power that can, in 
                                                
63 Nollkaemper (n 4) 772. 
64 Ibid, 781. 
65 Ibid, 778. 
66 The possibilities for cross-fertilization, however, are strong. For an argument that the common law may 
legitimately extend participatory rights, see G Cartier, ‘Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of 
Judicial Abstinence?’ (2003) 53 University of Toronto Law Journal 217. 
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a very practical sense, generate or undermine substantive rights.’67A paradox emerges whereby a 
court may seek to preserve ‘the value of an intermediate good [which] may undermine its 
contribution to the final public good.’68 The intermediate good that the courts are protecting is 
the legitimacy of judicial review. Courts are of course a good worth protecting, but their 
approach to the duty to consult and accommodate undermines a final public good such as the 
protection of Aboriginal rights (from the perspective of Indigenous peoples) and reconciliation 
(from the perspective of the larger Canadian public interest which also includes Indigenous 
peoples). No easy solution exists for this problem, but the application of the current framework 
prevents examination of the implicit choices judges make in order to skirt the ‘big questions’.69 I 
suspect that if Canadian jurisprudence acknowledged the presence of substantive fairness and 
substantive legitimate expectations in procedural fairness, then the fairness of consultative 
procedures and accommodations might be made more transparent and rigorous.70 
 
Looking at the duty to consult and accommodate from the perspective of process and 
substance in procedural fairness discussed in section three, the differing roles accorded to 
legitimate expectations is manifest. If we understand a legitimate expectation simply as an 
expectation that deserves judicial protection based on a government promise, representation or 
practice then it initially seems akin to but less onerous than the fiduciary duty that underpins 
state-Aboriginal legal relations. But jurisprudence from England (and Wales) suggests that 
substantive legitimate expectations can play as weighty a role as the fiduciary duty does in 
Aboriginal administrative law. In the leading English case on substantive fairness, Coughlan,71 
the Court of Appeal explained the different forms of protection available for expectations: 1) the 
government must give appropriate weight to the previous policy or other representation and, if it 
does, the courts will review on a highly deferential standard; 2) if the promise or practice induces 
a legitimate expectation of, e.g., being consulted, courts will then require that outcome unless 
there is an overriding reason to deny it; and 3) if a legitimate expectation is established, and the 
benefit is substantive rather than procedural, a reviewing court will weigh whether frustrating the 
expectation is so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power.72 In Coughlan, the promise to Mrs. 
Coughlan of a home for life was very important and the financial consequences of holding the 
authority to account were minimal, so the court decided in her favour.  
 
                                                
67 TO Main, ‘The Procedural Foundations of Substantive Law’ (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review 801, 
802. 
68 Nollkaemper (n 4) 783. 
69 Jenny Martinez reconsiders process and substance in the US ‘War on Terror’ decisions, examining five procedural 
strategies judges use to avoid substance: (1) procedure as avoidance; (2) process as merely signaling substantive 
issues; (3) process as substance; (4) substance as disguised process; and (5) process as housekeeping where values 
like accuracy and efficiency drive the decisions. All of these strategies are evident in the Canadian jurisprudence on 
the duty to consult and accommodate. See JS Martinez, ‘Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”’ (2008) 108 
Columbia Law Review 1013.  
70 Lorne Sossin discusses judicial tactics similar to those identified by Martinez, tactics he terms ‘prudential 
proceduralism’. He also considers creatively designed procedures, such as the frameworks discussed in this chapter, 
where courts manage substantive issues through procedural means. See L Sossin, ‘The McLachlin Court and the 
Promise of Procedural Justice,’ in DA Wright and AM Dodek (eds), Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First 
Decade (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2011) 58. 
71 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 231 (CA). 
72 See Endicott (n 51) 289–95. 
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In more recent cases, however, the English courts have moved away from this 
categorized approach toward one where proportionality is the appropriate test, subject to 
deference since substantive unfairness is a ground that does not generally justify judicial review. 
Once an applicant, establishes the legitimacy of the expectation, the relevant authority must 
identify any overriding interest on which it relies to justify frustration of the expectation. The 
courts will then step in to weigh the requirements of fairness against the overriding interest(s) 
and demand objective justification that the measures used were proportionate in the 
circumstances.73 Deference will be shown when the authority proves—through evidence and/or 
reasons—that its refusal or failure to honour the expectation was justified in the public interest 
and that it had carefully considered both the substance of the issue and fairness concerns as 
highly relevant factors in its decision-making process. Proportionality, again, is key and provides 
the mechanism to link, join or fuse process and substance. 
 
Canadian judicial direction to focus on process at the expense of outcome is at odds with 
contemporary constitutional and administrative law. The Charter Section 174 balancing exercise 
employed under the Oakes test, for example, explicitly incorporates into the analysis the 
outcome under step 2. The framework for the Oakes test has two steps, the second with three 
substeps: (1) there must be a pressing and substantial objective; 2) the means to achieve it must 
be proportional; (2a) the means must be rationally connected to the objective; (2b) there must be 
minimal impairment of rights; and (2c) there must be proportionality between the infringement 
and objective. 75 Moreover, it shifts the burden to the government to justify the consequences so 
that they are consistent with both upholding constitutional rights and permitting their limitation 
when such limits further legitimate democratic goals. Similarly, under reasonableness review in 
administrative law—as well as under the new Doré76 framework for assessing discretionary 
decisions that implicate Charter values (discussed further below)—the court may invalidate a 
decision on the basis of the unreasonableness of the outcome, as well as the process of 
articulating the reasons supporting the outcome. Procedural rules implement substantive law to 
produce quality outcomes as measured by norms embedded in substantive law and the decision-
maker’s own reasons.77 But, in the duty to consult, we see that process undermines substantive 
legality, legitimacy, and the recognition of potential rights.  
 
If we hold institutional comity in mind, it is not a breach of that doctrine to hold an 
authority to account to decisions and choice to which it has committed itself, unless it provides 
reasons indicating legitimate grounds to support a change of mind. Following Timothy Endicott, 
                                                
73 For a recent statement of the test for substantive legitimate expectations, see the Privy Council decision Paponette 
v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32, [49]. For a discussion of proportionality, reasons and 
the legitimate expectations as a highly relevant factor see Lord Dyson SCJ’s decision at [36]–[42]. This is consistent 
with earlier cases such as R v Department of Education and Employment, ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 and R 
(Abdi & Nadarajah) v Home Secretary [2005] EWCA Civ 1363—both cases where expectations received no 
protection. 
74 Section 1 reads: ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.’ See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK). 
75 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
76 Doré v Barreau du Québec 2012 SCC 12, 1 SCR 395 (‘Doré’). 
77 Nollkaemper (n 4) 779. 
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then, a continuum of different kinds of expectations might exist attracting greater or lesser 
substantive content. Legitimate expectations could range from the largely minimal as in current 
procedural fairness to the more maximal as in current Aboriginal administrative law.78 In either 
case, this component fuses process and substantive to explicitly acknowledge the role of 
substantive fairness. Duty to consult cases that involve unproved interests and rights raise real 
concerns about abuses of power. If we agree with Timothy Endicott that ‘[i]t can be procedurally 
unfair to disappoint an expectation without a hearing, and it can be substantively unfair to 
disappoint an expectation. And then the decision is unlawful if it is procedurally unfair, or it is so 
unfair in substance that it is an abuse of power …’79 then the duty to consult and accommodate 
and procedural fairness share a similar the problem wrought by the process/substance distinction: 
further jurisprudential development of substantive (un)fairness, better reason-giving, and explicit 
proportionality analyses within their respective decisional frameworks. Greater attention to 
outcomes may result in the minimization of infringements on unproved but strong Aboriginal 
rights, the lessening of impact of activity on Indigenous land so that it does not disrupt 
Indigenous use and occupation (especially given the requirement of prioritization), and go some 
distance to accommodating Indigenous peoples’ preferred mode of exercising their rights as part 
of self-governance. 
 
V.  CONSUBSTANTIATING PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE: REVIEW OF 
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS AS THE THIRD FAULT LINE 
 
The analogous legal frameworks employed in administrative and constitutional law have—or 
are—developing proportionality analyses that protect fundamental rights and values, permit 
justified limitations through the provision of adequate reasons, and exhibit deference where 
appropriate. These frameworks permit reviewing courts to assess the legitimacy of the substance 
and the outcomes which limit or harm important rights and values. Section three showed how 
analysis is bifurcated in procedural fairness since the presence of reasons is a question for 
procedure while the adequacy of reasons is a question for substantive review. Section four 
illustrated how the duty to consult and accommodate shares these features, but does not always 
succeeded in justifying the limitations or fully attend to the consequential harmful effects of the 
decision, despite employing two mini-proportionality analysis and insisting that the decision-
maker correctly assess the strength of the claim and the severity of the impact (potentially, but 
only if outcomes are considered). 
 
In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision, Doré, the Supreme Court overturned the 
past methodological approach that was used in previous jurisprudence to review discretionary 
decisions involving Charter interests and values. The Supreme Court confirmed that the old 
orthodox approach used to review whether or not a law justifiably infringes a right or freedom—
the Oakes test—should not replace administrative law review of discretionary decisions. Doré, 
affirmed that an administrative decision-maker must not disproportionately and unreasonably 
limit a Charter right or value when exercising a statutory discretion.  
 
  
                                                
78 For a provocative philosophical argument that the state should be considered a fiduciary of its entire political 
community, see Fox-Decent (n 36). 
79 Endicott (n 51) 295. 
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A.  The framework for the standard of review involving discretionary decisions 
 
In exercising discretion, the decision-maker should first identify the relevant statutory objectives 
as well as the values pertinent to that statutory context.80 Once identified, the decision-maker 
then engages in a balancing exercise that involves weighing the relevant statutory objectives and 
the Charter values. The decision-maker needs to consider how Charter values will best be 
protected in light of the statutory scheme. This involves engaging in a proportionality analysis 
that balances the severity of the interference (if any) with the importance of the statutory 
objectives.81 The decisional framework used by courts to review the resulting decision on 
substantive grounds contains four factors: 
 
The Standard of Review Framework 
1. Look to past jurisprudence to see how particular category of question was addressed—if satisfactorily—regarding level of 
deference owed.82 
2. If not satisfactory, contextually analyze using the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation four factors: 
a. the presence or absence of a privative clause; 
b. the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; 
c. the nature of the question at issue; 
d. the expertise of the tribunal.83 
 
A reviewing court will exhibit deference to a decision-maker’s decision that is the result of this 
balancing exercise. 84  The appropriate standard of review for discretionary decisions that 
implicate Charter values is reasonableness contextually applied.85 Since the Dunsmuir86 case, 
and with a recent fundamental qualification, reasonableness has so far been confirmed as the 
presumptive standard for reviewing administrative decisions in administrative law when: (1) a 
specialized or expert tribunal; (2) interpreting its enabling or home statute; (3) on a question of 
fact or mixed fact and law; (4) or has the jurisdiction to consider questions of law; (5) or is 
exercising broad statutory discretion; (6) correctly applies all legal principles or tests; (7) to 
construct an interpretation of its statutory powers that falls within the range of possible 
acceptable interpretations; (8) resulting in a decision that demonstrates justification, transparency 
and intelligibility; (9) and produces a reasonable outcome which is defensible in respect of the 
facts and law. Should the tribunal satisfy all of these conditions, the reviewing court must find 
the decision reasonable. So far, correctness review has been relegated to the margins, but not 
ruled out.87 Following Dunsmuir, the proportionality test will be satisfied if the measure falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes and is explained by reasons exhibiting 
                                                
80 Doré (n 76) [55]. 
81 Ibid, [57]. 
82 Note that the case law has not yet sorted out how and when precedent will control. 
83 Note that a privative clause and agency expertise generally receive enough weight to attract the deferential 
reasonableness standard either alone or in concert, whereas a question of law should only attract a correctness 
standard if it is a question general law outside of specialized area of expertise and of central importance to the legal 
system as a whole. 
84 Doré (n 76) [57]. Reasonableness review is not ‘a single, rigid Procrustean standard of decontextualized review’ 
but, rather, encompasses a range of degrees of deference based on the circumstances of the case. See Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa 2009 SCC 12, 1 SCR 339, [59]. 
85 Ibid, [56]. 
86 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, [47] (‘Dunsmuir’). 
87 See JM Evans, ‘Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?’ (2014) 27 Canadian Journal 
of Administrative Law & Practice 101. 
   
 23 
justification, transparency and intelligibility. The principle of deference informs this exercise, as 
a reviewing court must recognize that when the nature of the decision is discretionary, 
polycentric and involves balancing competing considerations, micro-managing by courts should 
be eschewed.88  
 
Entrenched fundamental values are recognized as having deontological weight, but it is 
permissible to limit these values if the limitation is proportionate, accompanied by a legally 
structured justification, and the harmful effects minimal. In Canadian constitutional law, this 
methodology is embedded in the Oakes test that pragmatically combines deontological and 
consequentialist considerations. We have seen part of this common law methodology in both 
procedural review and the duty to consult and accommodate. Recent administrative law cases 
therefore indicate that the post-Charter cross-fertilization of Canadian administrative and 
constitutional law continues.89 But, as Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent claim: 
 
To generalize that methodology in the common law of judicial review is undeniably to 
reform administrative law. Elements that were part of administrative law, but not central 
to it, move to centre stage. Talk of unfettered discretion and jurisdictional talk become 
gradually obsolete as they are replaced by talk of structures of justification. No hard and 
fast distinction between process and substance is available, as recognition grows of the 
inevitable substantive implications of process as well as of the fact that the justification 
for having process at all is in some sense substantive.90 
 
As discussed above, the movement of reasons into substantive review confirms this view because 
reasons have now taken centre stage in Canadian administrative law.  
 
B.  Comparing current frameworks for process and substance 
 
But, the modern reform of Canadian administrative law clearly needs to continue. To that end, I 
want to engage in a synthetic thought experiment using the framework from procedural fairness 
and that from substantive review, at the same time keeping in mind the fault-line around 
substantive fairness that the duty to consult and accommodate discloses. The following table 
compares the two frameworks used in reviewing procedures and substance: 
 
  
                                                
88 Doré (n 76) [51]. 
89 See E Fox-Decent, ‘The Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization or Inconstancy’ in C Flood and L 
Sossin (eds), Administrative Law in Context: A New Casebook, 2nd ed (Toronto, Emond-Montgomery, 2013).  
90 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent (n 13) 238. 
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Comparison of the Baker Framework with the Framework used in Substantive Review91 
What is similar and 
what is not 
Baker five-factor framework for determining the 
level of procedural fairness 
Standard of Review decisional framework (formerly 
the pragmatic and functional analysis) 
Overlap Nature of the decision (and the process followed). 
May involve interpretation or discretion regarding 
procedures. 
Nature of the question: 
law, fact, mixed fact and law, or discretion. 
Unique --- Privative clause. 
Overlap Nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of review. 
Weight of home statute. 
Language/purpose of the provision and within the Act 
as a whole. 
Weight of home statute. 
Overlap  
[when dicta included] 
Importance of the decision to the individual(s) affected. Decisions must reflect the “fundamental importance” of 
Charter values. 





Respect agency expertise in determining and following 
own procedures particularly with respect to its home 
statute. 
Expertise of the tribunal particularly with respect to its 
home statute. 
Role of reasons May be required by the common law. Reasons must demonstrate justification, transparency, 
and intelligibility. 
Consequentialism Defensible outcome in respect of facts and law. Reasonable outcome in respect of facts and law. 
 
When placed side-by-side like this, the overlap is striking. The nature of question, the statutory 
scheme, the weight of fundamental values along with the concurrent demand for proportionality, 
the requirements of deference in the acknowledgement of expertise, and the role of reasons in 
terms of justifying the outcome are all shared between the two frameworks. The key differences 
are: the role given to a privative clause as a different ground for deference in substantive review; 
legitimate expectations as a separate factor in procedural fairness; and, the bifurcation of reasons 
between procedure (providing reasons) and substance (examining reasons for reasonableness and 
rationality in the decision under review). As discussed above, Canadian administrative law 
currently burbles with tensions and overlaps between process and substance and this 
juxtaposition of the two frameworks underscores a vital question: does the distinction between 
process and substance in administrative law have any continued salience given that the two 
frameworks used in judicial review markedly overlap and could potentially be combined? 
Furthermore, what might the implications be for Charter review and the Oakes test? Could one 
simple overarching test in public law be constructed that takes into account rights, legislative 
intent, and the principles of deference, legality and proportionality? 
 
C.  Hypothesizing one universal, overarching framework for public law 
 
If, as I have suggested above, Canadian law embraced substantive fairness, acknowledged more 
transparently the need to identify and specify the content of fundamental values explicitly in 
proportionately analyses, and conceded that reasons consubstantiate substance and process, we 
                                                
91 Italics indicate a factor unique to that particular framework. Underline indicates guidance from the jurisprudence 
but which is not formally part of the framework. 
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might re-imagine a court reviewing process and substance using a unified framework.92 This 
framework and its animating questions might look like the following ‘macro review’ 
framework:93 
 
Overarching Framework When Distinction is Removed 
Question asked Framework element 
What is being challenged? Nature of the decision and/or the process followed. 
What guidance does the statute 
provide? 
Nature of the statutory scheme, terms of review, and purpose of the provision. 
Note that the framework subsumes the private clause into the statutory scheme but gives it 
heavy weight instead. 
What are the animating principles and 
values in the home statute as well as 
those identified by the person who is 
challenging the decision? 
Identify the fundamental values implicated in the case as a whole. 
How much deference is owed? Respect agency expertise in procedures and in interpretation of the law under the home statute. 
Are the reasons adequate? Demonstrate justification, transparency, and intelligibility appropriate to the context. 
Is the outcome reasonable? Outcome / effects of limit are proportionate. 
 
My intent here, however, is not prescriptive. Major renovation of the current frameworks used 
for procedural fairness and substantive review seems highly unlikely in Canadian public law 
right now. The point is that if courts acknowledged the process/substance connection—rather 
than merely distinction—the decisional framework used for judicial review in administrative law 
might be simplified by being shared between the two domains. Weighting factors would move 
into the spotlight, fairness would be assessed substantively and contextually, attention to 
outcomes would be more robust, and courts could finally explicitly recognize that agency 
expertise includes interpretation and not just procedure. Deference would be grounded in these 
considerations combined with a transparent examination of the values brought to the case from 
the statute, the common law, and the parties. Reasons would identify and harms and would 
explain the rationale for upholding, expanding or denying individual rights and the exercise of 
government power. In this manner, the principle of deference could therefore embody the 
connection between procedural and substantive norms and, in turn, structure the scope of judicial 
review. 
 
In short, acknowledgement of the process/substance connection would affect the 
Canadian model of judicial review. It would ground deference differently and move it closer to 
‘deference as respect’ ideal where administrative decision-makers are recognized as expert 
partners, though not co-equals, in coordinate construction of the constitutional order. 94 
 
  
                                                
92 It is difficult to fit the complex framework developed under the duty to consult and accommodate into these 
simpler frameworks. This begs two questions: (1) should the duty to consult and accommodate framework be 
simplified?; or (2) should the other frameworks be complexified? 
93 I thank Jason Varuhas for suggesting this characterization of the proffered framework. 
94 Similarly, Craig (n 43) 163 when writing about proportionality and reasonableness review states: ‘Suffice it to say 
for the present that a condition precedent to reasoned deliberation as to how the balancing should be conducted is 
open and honest recognition that it is being undertaken’.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION: RITES OF TRANSUBSTANTIATING PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE 
 
The previous section concluded that process and substance are connected—indeed, even 
transubstantiated in administrative law—but my argument also concedes that the terms continue 
to serve functional and descriptive purposes in practice. The reality of many features of the law 
is not just the co-existence of these attribute, but their necessary and reciprocal intermingling. 
Acknowledging the reality of the connection should lead not just to the creation of higher-order 
decisional frameworks but also to better and more transparent application of these frameworks. 
In other words, the focus is on better and best practices. Accepting the existence of substantive 
fairness in the doctrine of legitimate expectations would be one example of a better practice 
within a best practice framework. As both Geneviève Cartier and David Mullan contend, ridding 
ourselves of pernicious and formalistic effects of the process/substance distinction in 
administrative law permits the ‘real questions’ to be asked and demands that public officials and 
judges provide ‘real answers’ in their decisions.95 
 
This conclusion is also based a consideration of the importance of fundamental values 
whose content and reach are being currently worked out in Canadian public law. These fault 
lines have had beneficial effect. They suggest that the Canadian practice of judicial review now 
rests on substantive ideals or values and that judges use these substantive criteria as guidance and 
for justification. These values include democracy, dignity, equality, autonomy, and human 
rights.96 Or, as L’Heureux-Dubé J writes in the Baker decision: ‘…discretionary decisions will 
generally be given considerable respect … discretion must be exercised in accordance with the 
boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of 
administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the 
Charter.’97 
 
A political community committed to both democracy and legality will provide multiple 
routes for those affected by public power to demand fairness, to have input into the decision-
making process, and to have quality reasons for those decisions. These considerations constrain 
public power under the rule of law, but they also enable members to participate as members of a 
democracy, as rights holders, and as claims-makers. The reasons requirement furthers 
accountability, but it also provides the bases for public justification and judicial deference to 
administrative decisions. Of the three areas canvassed, Aboriginal administrative law shows the 
potential for greater democratic content, despite its current flaws. The procedural nature of the 
duty to consult and accommodate for Aboriginal communities as emerging constitutional 
partners means that democratic participatory rights are heightened and the decision-maker may 
be required to change her mind in order to avoid substantive unfairness. This duty stands as a 
                                                
95 G Cartier, ‘The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations’ in G Huscroft and M Taggart (eds), Inside and Outside 
Canadian Administrative Law (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006) 186–87. She is citing the seminal article 
by David Mullan, ‘Fairness: The New Natural Justice?’ (1975) University of Toronto Law Journal 281. 
96 Dawn Oliver identifies five overarching systemic values: autonomy, dignity, respect, status, and security: see D 
Oliver, ‘The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law’ in Michael Taggart (ed), The Province of Administrative 
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997). Paul Daly identifies four ‘core’ values, namely the rule of law, good 
administration, democracy, and the separation of powers: see P Daly, ‘Administrative Law: A Values-Based 
Approach’ (in this volume).  
97 Baker (n 37) [56]. 
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touchstone for emerging substantive content on consultation, participation and accommodation 
in other areas of public law. 
 
These ideals, however, place enormous stress on both the traditional ‘Diceyan’ and 
quintessential American model of judicial review. The stress is mitigated, but not removed, by 
the provision of reasons. Reasons place a burden and an advantage: the burden rests on the 
decision-maker to justify their decision according to fundamental values, but the advantage shifts 
in judicial review because judges must look to the justification given for the outcome, not just 
the outcome itself. In administrative law, this means that correctness review is presumptively 
foreclosed and, when the judge disagrees with both the reasoning and the outcome, must herself 
engage with the decision and provide her own justification for a different result. Moreover, there 
are many ways for other branches to respond to judicial decisions in administrative law. This 
creates a more responsive, transparent, and accountable relationship between the judiciary and 
other institutional actors, an ideal that in Canada is called “institutional dialogue.”98 Just as 
importantly, an institutional dialogue which permits a fruitful connection between process and 
substance can also buttress and generate “dialogue rights” and relations among individuals, 
groups and decision-makers that go beyond the content of more conventional duties and rights.99  
 
Both democracy and the rule of law justify the creation of institutional mechanisms for 
citizens and affected persons to prevent or challenge the abuse of power by public officials. As 
we have seen, the rule of law supports the creation of procedures that treat individuals fairly 
when their rights, interests and privileges are affected in public decision-making. The rule of law 
also supports judicial review of administrative decisions on their merits and greater access to the 
courts through the expansion of standing and intervener status. The hope here is that judicial 
deliberation will lead to better and more reasonable decision-making processes and policy 
outcomes. A participatory democracy will create conduits for direct participation in decision-
making and greater accountability through both legal and public oversight. Deliberative practices 
such as reason-giving support the creation of open processes for public reasoning and debate and 
may lead to more justifiable public policies. At their best, these practices show how “our shared 
sense of justice is compatible with a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” inherent in 
a liberal-democratic culture.100 Contemporary governance therefore offers a range of institutional 
possibilities for public participation on democracy and rule of law grounds. 101 From my 
examination of recent developments in administrative law, I look to the larger democratic 
potential of public law to better realize the connection between procedural fairness and 
substantive public law values for all affected persons, citizens or not, in a liberal democracy.102 
                                                
98 For an overview of the various models of institutional dialogue, including Canada’s, see S Gardbaum, 
‘Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 167.  
99 See PP Craig, ‘Process and Substance in Judicial Review’ in Huscroft and Taggart (n 95) 176. 
100 J Gledhill, ‘Procedure in substance and substance in procedure: reframing the Rawls-Habermas debate’ in JG 
Finlayson and F Freyenhagen (eds), Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political (Routledge, New York, 2011).  
101 Richard Bellamy, ‘The Republic of Reasons: Public Reasoning, Depoliticization, and Non-Domination’ in 
Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds), Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
102 Rawls’s theory would specify content. In contrast, Jürgen Habermas argues that a legal procedural morality is 
one where law ‘has rid itself of all specific normative contents…[and which have been] sublimated into a procedure 
for the justification of possible normative contents’. See J Habermas, ‘Law and Morality’ The Tanner Lectures on 
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As most modern political theorists contend, the modern state in pluralist conditions 
fundamentally depends on the working out of substantive values through institutional practices 
that contribute to procedural legitimacy in public institutions.103 
 
The legal frameworks examined here should, and in some cases do, amount to practices 
of discourse that, when properly engaged, are reflexive in nature and compel claimants and 
decision-makers to become more transparent about their background suppositions concerning 
rights, goods and conceptions of justice. These frameworks disclose the reciprocal relationship 
between process and substance. I have argued that the relationship between process and 
substance contains the further promise of our ability to bootstrap the reciprocal relationship 
“between government and citizen with respect to the observance of rules,”104 standards, and now 
fundamental values in Canadian liberal-democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Human Values, trans. Kenneth Baynes (1986) 247 (available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-
z/h/habermas88.pdf). 
103 Habermas privileges democratic procedures, while Rawls’s a priori constraining principles entail that courts play 
a vital role in creating guidelines for what counts as admissible reasons. Through practices of public reason, the 
hope is that we can reconcile ourselves to the unreconciliable—our social world and its multiplicity of incompatible 
or overlapping comprehensive doctrines. See J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993) lviii. 
104 L Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1969) 39. See James 
Boyle on the unresolved tensions concerning form, process, and substance in Fuller’s work: ‘Legal Realism and the 
Social Contract: Fuller’s Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance’ (1993) 78 Cornell Law 
Review 371. 
